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The Testamentary Foundations of Commercial
Arbitration
PETER B. RUTLEDGE*
ABSTRACT This Article offers the first systematic treatment of the
relationship between commercial arbitration and testamentary arbitration.
(By testamentary arbitration, I mean an arbitration clause contained in a
will requiring beneficiaries to resolve differences over the estate by means of
an enforceable decision by a private party rather than judicial resolution in
a probate court.) Recent scholarship and jurisprudence have questioned the
enforceability of these arrangements as incompatible with the requirement of
a written "agreement" between parties to the arbitration. Contrary to these
views, close examination of the historical record of testamentary arbitration
leading to the Federal Arbitration Act's enactment reveals a rudimentary set
of doctrines not unlike those found in modern American commercial
arbitration jurisprudence. These doctrines cover topics such as the
allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators, as well as judicial
review of arbitration awards. These findings carry important implications for
both testamentary arbitration and commercial arbitration. They respond to
critics alleging that testamentary arbitration cannot be sustained absent
express legislative fixes in state statutes. They also support the trend, found
in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, of cross-fertilizing arbitration
precedent from one field (like labor or investment arbitration) into another
(like commercial arbitration).
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SITUATING COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND TESTAMENTARY
ARBITRATION HISTORICALLY
A. Literature on Testamentary Arbitration
B. The Historical Parallels Between Testamentary Arbitration and
Commercial Arbitration
1. ENGLISH RooTs
2. EARLYAMERICAN DECISIONS
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3. THE ASCENDANCY OF TESTAMENTARYARBITRATION IN THE LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
III. ALIGNING HISTORICAL CONCEPTS FROM TESTAMENTARY ARBITRATION
WITH MODERN CONCEPTS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Kompetenz/kompetenz
B. Separability
C. Award enforcement - generally
D. Neutrality of decision maker
E. Award enforcement - non-statutory grounds
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TESTAMENTARY AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
V. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
[A]ll disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be decided by three
impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good
understanding ... [who] shall, unfettered by Law, or legal constructions,
declare their sense of the Testator's intention; and such decision is, to all
intents and purposes to be as binding on the parties as if it had been
given in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Excerpt from the last will and testament of
President George Washington'
So gross a departure from the manifest intent of the testator, cannot be
the result of an honest endeavor to find that intent; and must be
considered as a fraudulent exercise of a power, given for the purpose of
preserving peace and preventing expensive and frivolous litigation.
Excerpt from Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Pray v. Belt2
Over the course of the twentieth century, arbitration in the United States
enjoyed a meteoric ascent. The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") in 1925 enhanced the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
GEORGE WASHINGTON, AUTHENTICATED COPY OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON OF MT. VERNON 28 (A. Jackson 1868).
2
Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. 670, 680 (1828).
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commercial contracts. I Ratification of various international arbitration
treaties, such as the New York Convention of 1958, provided a similar boost
in the field of international arbitration.4 More recently, a spate of Supreme
Court decisions have facilitated the expansion of arbitration into previously
verboten areas, including employment disputes, consumer disputes, and most
disputes involving statutory claims under federal and state law.'
Consistent with this trend, testamentary arbitration represents another
area of growing importance. In the prototypical case, a testator specifies in
her will that any disputes over the distribution of the estate shall be resolved
by arbitration.' Similar issues arise with respect to inter vivos trusts where the
document establishing the trust specifies that all disputes between
beneficiaries must be resolved by arbitration.'
The enforceability and desirability of such clauses has received increased
attention among scholars and has been the subject of recent state legislation
and decisional law. Some scholars have vigorously argued that such clauses
are enforceable, while others see insurmountable problems due to the lack of
a written agreement between the disputants.8 Courts are similarly divided.'
Amid this confusion, some states-such as Arizona-have expressly adopted
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925).
4
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, US SOURCE, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. See also 1965 Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, US
Source, 575 U.N.T.S. 579; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration (Panama Convention, Jan. 30, 1975).
5
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013);
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros,
S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
6
See, e.g., In re Estate of Heiney, No. I CA-CV 12-0456, 2013 WL 1846599 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2013); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013); In re Nestorovski
Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408 (D.C.
2006); Schoenberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), superseded by statute
Ariz. Rev. Stat. 14-10205.
7
For a good discussion of the relevant jurisprudence, see S.I. Strong, Arbitration of
Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1157 (2012);
S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 275 (2012).
See infra Part I.
9
Compare, e.g., Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013), with In re Calomiris,
894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006).
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legislation specifying that arbitration clauses in wills and trust agreements
are enforceable in cases of disputes among beneficiaries regardless of
whether they are in contractual privity."o
A central conundrum in these scholarly and doctrinal debates has
centered on whether, and the extent to which, the architecture of modem
commercial arbitration law can be easily transposed onto arbitrations arising
from clauses in wills and other testamentary instruments. These debates
presuppose that the rise of enforceable arbitration clauses in commercial
contracts predated the emergence of enforceable arbitration clauses in
testamentary documents and, thus, may not be readily adapted to
testamentary arbitration.
In my view, these debates have the history backwards. Well before the
FAA ended the "centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,""
courts in the United States routinely examined, and sometimes enforced,
arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments similar to the one contained in
George Washington's will (excerpted above). They also developed a
jurisprudence governing the enforceability of awards rendered by arbitrators
designated in such clauses. The enactment of the FAA-and parallel
developments at the state level-did not so much end a general hostility to
arbitration but, rather, helped to harmonize the law governing arbitration of
commercial disputes with a nascent law governing the arbitration of
testamentary disputes.
Close examination of the case law governing testamentary arbitration
from 1789 (the year of the Judiciary Act's enactment) to 1925 (the year of
the FAA's enactment) reveals primordial forms of many doctrines associated
today with commercial arbitration. These include, for example, rules
regarding allocation of the competence between arbitrators and judges to
decide "gateway" issues to the enforceability of the arbitration clause as well
as standards governing judicial review of the arbitrator's award. The above-
quoted excerpt from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Pray v. Belt
embraces an early conception of judicial review not unlike the contemporary
doctrine requiring that an arbitrator's award "draw its essence from the
agreement."l2
This connectivity between the two fields is hardly surprising. Private
individuals might prefer arbitration for many of the same reasons as
commercial parties. Arbitrators might bring a certain expertise to decisions
10 See Heiney, supra note 6.
Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). See also McMahon, 482
U.S. at 225.
12 See Pray, 26 U.S. 670.
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about how to dispose of the testator's property. The less public, if not
confidential, nature of the proceedings might appeal to the testator's
interests. Additionally, the presumptive finality of the award might reduce
the incidence of disputes.
The implications of this novel thesis-that modem-day commercial
arbitration does not simply inform testamentary arbitration but, in several
important respects, is informed by it- are profound. From the perspective of
commercial arbitration, it invites greater attention to the precedents in early
testamentary cases to inform current doctrine. From the perspective of
testamentary arbitration, it suggests that scholars and skeptics may be
overstating the incompatibility of testamentary arbitration with modem-day
commercial norms.
While novel, my thesis is measured. I do not argue that commercial
arbitration agreements and awards were unenforceable during the nineteenth
century. Nor am I arguing that arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments
were entirely enforceable during the same period. In both respects, the
doctrine is far more complex than these oversimplified narratives sometimes
depict. "
Moreover, while the doctrine governing testamentary arbitration during
this era can inform our understanding of commercial arbitration, the two
systems are, to be sure, not entirely analogous. As just one example (more to
come later), commercial arbitration often involves sorting out the legal rights
and remedies of two parties present before the decision maker. By contrast,
testamentary arbitration typically involves discerning the intent of a single
party-the testator-who is, by definition, unavailable. Despite these
limitations, scholars and practitioners of modern-day commercial arbitration
still can learn a great deal from its testamentary forbears.
This thesis unfolds in three parts. Part I reviews the literature. It then
traces the history of testamentary arbitration and weaves it into an account of
the development of commercial arbitration during the same era. The
takeaway from Part I is that while commercial arbitration agreements
(especially executory ones) were slow to achieve judicial acceptance,
testamentary arbitration clauses enjoyed a healthy degree of judicial
solicitude, especially during the late nineteenth century before the FAA's
enactment.
13
For rich discussions of the history of commercial arbitration prior to the FAA's
enactment, see Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration
Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the, United States, 11 J. L. EcoN. & ORG.
479, 485-90 (1995); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 15-24 (1992).
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Part II demonstrates how the doctrine of testamentary arbitration during
this period aligns with the modem-day analogues in commercial arbitration.
It identifies a series of concepts in modem-day commercial arbitration-like
kompetenz/kompetenz, manifest disregard of the law, and others-and shows
how the seeds of those doctrines were already present in the jurisprudence on
testamentary arbitration well before the FAA's enactment.
Part III builds on Part II and traces the implications, and limits, of this
thesis, both for commercial arbitration and testamentary arbitration, as a
matter of theory and as a matter of practice. First, it encourages the greater
cross-fertilization of precedents from different fields of arbitration, such as
the influence of testamentary precedents on commercial decisions or the
influence of commercial precedents on labor arbitration decisions. Second, it
responds to the critics who argue that commercial arbitration jurisprudence
cannot be easily mapped onto testamentary arbitration cases. Third, it charts
a course for future research about testamentary arbitration, especially the
puzzling question about the near-complete absence of jurisprudence
following the Supreme Court's decision in Pray, and the sudden re-
emergence of such jurisprudence in the late nineteenth century.
I. SITUATING COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND TESTAMENTARY
ARBITRATION HISTORICALLY
This section does two things. First, it reviews the literature governing
testamentary arbitration. Second, it situates the little-known history about the
law governing testamentary arbitration alongside the better-known history
about the law governing commercial arbitration.
A. LITERATURE ON TESTAMENTARY ARBITRATION
I do not write on a blank slate. The arbitration of testamentary disputes
has attracted some attention in the scholarship, but none of that scholarship
systematically considers the connective tissue between testamentary disputes
and commercial arbitration.14 This section reviews that scholarship to explain
the original contribution of the present project.
Following some early descriptive writings about testamentary
arbitration," one of the first modem contributions to the topic came in an
Some literature focuses more on arbitration clauses in trust agreements rather than
wills, but these works often fold testamentary disputes into their discussions.
"1 Some early scholarship touched on the topic, but at a time when the doctrine was
far more hostile to arbitration, and not just of testamentary disputes. See Blaine
280
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article by Gary Spitko."6 Spitko advocated the use of arbitration clauses in
testamentary instruments in order to ensure that "majoritarian cultural
norms" (reflected in institutions like judges and juries) did not thwart the
testator's intent (which might reflect "dissident minority norms")." Spitko
argued that arbitration freed the nonconforming testator from the grip of
majoritarian cultural norms by privatizing disputes over his or her
intentions.'
Though Spitko's "cultural minority" model did not gain much traction in
the literature, it did identify two important issues that shaped subsequent
debates over enforceability of such clauses. First, Spitko noted that
objections to arbitration might arise from beneficiaries' lack of assent to the
clause. He overcame this objection by arguing that the testator's right to
devise her property as she sees fit entails a right to condition how disputes
over that devise will be resolved.19 Second, Spitko noted that objections to
the validity of the devising instrument might arise. He overcame this
objection by arguing that, under the doctrine of separability (under which
arbitration clauses are treated as separate contracts within the contracts
containing them), questions about the enforceability of the testament do not
necessarily taint the arbitration clause.2 0
Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity ofArbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 521 (1967); Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration: Step-Child of Wills and
Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956).
16
E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
From Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 275 (1999).
17 Id. at 281-94.
1Id at 294-97.
19
Id at 297-303.
20
Id at 303-07. Spitko also notes that questions might arise about the neutrality of
the arbitrator, particularly if the arbitrator's interests are closely aligned with the testator.
Spitko proposes an alternative arbitration scheme under which a three-arbitrator tribunal
resolves disputes, consisting of one arbitrator chosen by the testator, one by the will
contestant and a third from the party appointees. Id. at 307-14. This argument is not
especially noteworthy. Federal and state arbitration laws already contain protections
against the enforcement of awards rendered by biased arbitrations. See, e.g. 9 U.S.C.
§10(a)(1)-(2) (2015); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968). Moreover, the "mandatory three-arbitrator" model raises several other
workability problems. For one thing, it is hard to see how the testator will nominate the
arbitrator if he or she is dead; the testator might name a specific individual in the will, but
that provision carries its own pitfalls (particularly if the named individual is unable or
unwilling to perform the designated duty). For another thing, three-arbitrator models
often are more expensive, more time consuming and less efficient than a single arbitrator
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Following Spitko, most literature focused on whether, and to what
extent, arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments should be enforceable
and, if so, the proper legal architecture necessary to ensure that result in light
of the sorts of objections-like assent and validity-that Spitko identified.
An early contribution to this stream came from a pair of attorneys who urged
the incorporation of arbitration clauses in trust documents. 2 1 Such devices
help secure a seamless distribution of property and "ensure that trust disputes
do not escalate into courtroom battles entangling all parties in what is often
bitter litigation."22 They noted, however, that at the moment when binding
arbitration requires the parties' voluntary participation, the legal
enforceability of such clauses is, at best, questionable.23 In their view, this
doctrine rested on the archaic notion that trust instruments are not contracts,
and the authors disputed this by explaining why a contractual model of trust
instruments is superior. 24 Nonetheless, the authors recognized that judicial
acceptance of the contract model of trusts has come slowly, and
consequently, urged state legislatures to adopt laws expressly providing that
25
arbitration clauses in trust or testamentary documents are enforceable.
Shortly after the publication of this early commentary, two other scholars
26
sounded a much more skeptical note. First, Stephen Murphy identified a series
of statutory and other doctrinal impediments to the enforceability of such
clauses, namely the conception that arbitration is predicated upon an agreement
(typically lacking in a donative instrument) and various state statutory
27
restrictions requiring judicial resolution of testamentary and other disputes. He
then reviewed a series of theories-including contract theory, benefit theory
and intent theory-as possible rationales for overcoming these statutory and
model. Finally, a single arbitrator model with a private appointing authority (like the
American Arbitration Association) addresses Spitko's neutrality concern while not
importing the "majoritarian cultural norms" that, in Spitko's theory, might arise from a
judicially appointed sole arbitrator.
21 Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A
Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They
Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351 (2007).
22 Id at 354.
23 Id. at 354-55.
24 Id. at 361-64.
25 Id. at 364-65.
26
See Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627 (2011).
27 Id at 639--44.
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doctrinal restrictions. 28 After reviewing the present statutory proposals to
enhance the arbitrability of such disputes, Murphy concluded with a series of
recommendations about how state legislatures might design reforms to the law
governing the enforcement of such provisions, taking into account the various
theoretical models he developed. These recommendations included considering
arbitration vs. mediation, treating will disputes differently from trust disputes,
differentiating disputes over donor capacity vs. disputes over the interpretation
of the donative instrument, and enforcing arbitration clauses vs. empowering
the judiciary to order arbitration.29
Shortly after Murphy, Erin Katzen also sounded a skeptical note.30 Like
others, Katzen acknowledged that consent presented a difficulty for
arbitration in any testamentary or trust dispute: the beneficiaries generally
will not have consented on a pre-dispute basis to arbitration.3' Building on
this argument, Katzen identified a further consent difficulty, namely that,
where disputes arise over whether the donor consented to the terms of the
testamentary or trust document, "the donor is not present to specify whether
she was in her right mind, which provisions of the document she intended, or
whether a third party misled or coerced her to include certain provisions."32
Despite these problems with consent, Katzen did not write off arbitration
entirely. First, she endorsed "no contest clauses" under which the contesting
beneficiary is guaranteed some or all of her bequest even if her challenge
fails, provided that she brings the challenge in arbitration.33 Second, she
endorsed a mixture of "default" and "mandatory" procedures to ensure that
the rights of parties are protected to the extent that their consent is dubious.
For example, default procedures might be embedded in state statutes and
modeled upon the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules governing
34
arbitration of wills and trusts. Mandatory procedures, in Katzen's view,
might range from certain safeguards that apply either in all cases or, at least,
2 8 Id. at 645-61.
29
Id. at 671-79.
30
See Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters
for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118 (2011).
31
Id. at 121-23.
32
Id. at 124.
33
Id. at 125-27.
34
Id at 13(-32.
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in cases where a court determines that the chosen rules of dispute settlement
are somehow unconscionable or unfair.
In the wake of this commentary, David Horton and Stacie Strong became
the first academics to give the topic sustained theoretical treatment. Horton
examined whether the FAA can govern arbitration clauses in testamentary
36instruments. While noting that the FAA explicitly applies only to
"contracts" or "agreements," he invokes federal common-law to extend the
FAA to any situation when the parties can plausibly be said to have agreed to
arbitrate.37 This opens the door to FAA coverage of arbitration clauses in
trusts and testamentary instruments. Trustees, executors or beneficiaries
accept fees or bequests pursuant to testamentary or trust instruments, which
manifests an "assent" to the instrument's terms, including its arbitration
38
clause. Horton concluded his article by exploring how several core
arbitration doctrines-including separability and FAA preemption-play out
in the context of testamentary and donative instruments.
Stacie Strong analyzed the compatibility of enforceable arbitration
clauses with trust agreements.4 0 Unlike Horton, Strong did not confine her
analysis to U.S. arbitration law; instead, she employed a more comparative
perspective, considering both trust forms and arbitration laws from other
4'
countries. Like Murphy, Strong reviewed the primary theories of trusts-
contractual, donative, intent, and benefit-and highlighted the basic
"collision" between these theories and arbitration, namely, that several of the
theories of trusts do not rest on the premise of an "agreement" between
settlor, trustee, and beneficiary, whereas most dominant theories of
Id. at 134-35.
36 David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90
N.C. L. REv. 1027, 1049-68 (2012).
37 Id at 1054-58.
Id. at 1058-65. In order to accommodate the probate exception to federal
jurisdiction, Horton carves out an exception for "core probate matters," which he defines
to include petitions to supervise administration of the testator's estate or to invalidate a
will. Id. at 1078.
3 9Id at 1081-89.
40
See Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 7. In a separate article,
Strong explores some of these same themes but focuses, instead, on drafting enforceable
clauses. She examines the AAA and ICC model clauses in depth, compares their
attributes, and identifies additional features that can enhance these clauses' enforceability
and efficacy. See Strong, Empowering Settlors, supra note 7, at 309-24.
41 See Murphy, supra note 26.
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42
arbitration presuppose the existence of an agreement between the parties.
After reviewing examples of legislation that favored mandatory arbitration of
trust disputes, Strong identified several prerequisites for enforcing such
clauses in common-law regimes. Such prerequisites included: the lack of any
"jurisdictional ouster" argument; an operable clause that can be effectively
performed; a clause that can adequately bind parties other than the settlor;
proper representation of the parties' interests in the arbitration; and the lack
43
of a "non-arbitrability" doctrine in the jurisdiction.
In sum, the literature is surprisingly sparse. Some scholarship addresses
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in testamentary documents. Little of
that scholarship, with the exception of the recent contributions by Strong and
Horton, has much theoretical grist. While compelling, Horton and Strong's
scholarship does not offer a model for thinking about issues of the
relationship between testamentary arbitration and commercial arbitration.
The next section picks up where the existing literature leaves off and offers
links between the two areas of the law.
B. The Historical Parallels Between Testamentary Arbitration And
Commercial Arbitration
The introduction sets forth the paradigmatic case involving testamentary
instruments: a will contains a provision specifying that any disputes over the
distribution of the decedent's estate shall be resolved by an arbitrator or
arbitral panel (sometimes the will's executor is identified as the arbitrator). If
such a dispute arises-whether among the beneficiaries or between the
beneficiaries and the executor(s)-can they be bound by the arbitration
clause in the will?4 As with commercial arbitration, the law in this area has
evolved substantially since the Founding. 45 This section examines the
parallels in development between the two fields.
42
See Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, supra note 7, at 1174-81.
43 See generally id. at 1196-1236.
44
Consequently, I put to the side "submission agreements" between beneficiaries, or
between beneficiaries and executor(s), after the testator has died. See, e.g., Turk v. Turk, 3
Ga. 422 (1847). These agreements fit more comfortably within the conventional paradigm of
arbitration; thus, do not implicate the unique issues presented by arbitrating death.
Other scholars have extensively documented the rich history of commercial
arbitration in the United States, and this paper does not engage directly in that debate. For
representative accounts, see generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE (2013);
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39-49 (2009); Benson,
supra note 13; MACNEIL, supra note 13.
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1. English Roots
The law governing the enforceability of arbitration clauses in wills
46
enjoys a rich historical pedigree. Examples of such clauses date at least to
47
the seventeenth century in England. In Philips v. Bury, an English court
confronted a clause in a will providing that "any differences will be resolved
,48
by an arbitrator whose decision shall be final." The court held that the
arbitration provision in that case technically was enforceable but stressed that
the provision could not impair the ability of any litigant to dispute the
49distribution of the estate in court. Consequently, as a practical matter,
decisions like Philips emasculated arbitration provisions in wills.so
This early English skepticism about testamentary arbitration paralleled a
similar skepticism about commercial arbitration, especially executory
agreements. Typical in this regard was Kill v. Hollister, where the court
refused to enforce an arbitration clause in an insurance contract on the
ground that "the agreement of the parties cannot oust this court" of
jurisdiction. Building on the English practice, commercial arbitration
followed a similar course during the colonial era in the United States.
Although arbitration thrived among merchants in the American colonies,
executory arbitration agreements remained unenforceable.52
2. Early American Decisions
Reported decisions by courts in the United States reflected dubiousness
about arbitration of testamentary disputes. Exemplary of this view was the
46 For a helpful historical roadmap, see generally Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration: Step-
Child of Wills and Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956).
47 Id. at 179.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50 This appears to contrast with the relatively more sympathetic view that English
law took with respect to arbitration clauses in trust agreements. See Janin, supra note 15,
at 522-24.
51 Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
52 According to one commentator, "[flrom whatever source they derived the practice,
the colonists engaged in extensive arbitration throughout the period of English Rule."
William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 198 (1956).
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U.S. Supreme Court's 1828 decision in Pray v. Belt.53 The clause in the will
at issue in Pray provided as follows:
Whereas my will is lengthy, and it is possible I may have
committed some error or errors, I do therefore authorize and
empower as fully as I could do myself, if living, a majority
of my acting executors, my wife having voice as executrix,
to decide all cases, in case of any dispute or contention:
whatever they may determine is my intention shall be final
and conclusive, without any resort to a Court of Justice.5 4
A dispute arose among legatees over a distribution of a portion of the
estate, and the executors decided the matter adverse to one of the legatees,
who then commenced an action in federal court. The circuit court found in
favor of the objecting legatees, and the executors appealed, arguing, among
other things, that their decision pursuant to the arbitration clause was
conclusive.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice John Marshall disagreed.
He reasoned that the judicial role in constructing a will is to give effect to the
testator's intent. While a testator might vest in arbitrators the power to
resolve disputes over the distribution of the estate, that power is not
completely immune from judicial review. That vesting of authority did not,
Marshall reasoned, "include the power of altering the will."55 Nor would it
authorize the arbitrators to deviate from the intent of the testator.
Consequently, Marshall concluded, "[i]f an unreasonable use be made of the
power, one not foreseen, and which could not be intended by the testator, it
has been considered as a case in which the general power of Courts of Justice
to decide on the rights of the parties ought to be exercised."56
Much like Chief Justice Marshall in Pray, American courts were
especially reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements in commercial
contracts.57 A leading proponent of this view was Justice Joseph Story who
wrote that an arbitration agreement is not specifically enforceable because it
"is essentially, in its very nature, an agreement which must rest in the good
53
Pray, 26 U.S. 670.
54Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 680.
56Id.
57
BORN, supra note 45, at 44-45.
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faith and honor of the parties, and like an agreement to paint a picture, to
carve a statute or to write a book . . . must be left to the conscience of the
parties or to such remedy in damages for the breach thereof, as the law has
provided." The Supreme Court (while Joseph Story was a Justice) sounded
a similar skepticism holding, for example, in an 1836 decision, that an
arbitration agreement unlawfully sought to "oust" a court of jurisdiction, and
thus could not be invoked to prevent a civil action. In other words,
arbitration agreements might be effective as long as parties voluntarily
abided by them, and private commercial sanctions might provide a powerful
incentive to do so. But if they were breached, a party's damages could, at
most, be nominal monetary relief; specific performance-that is, a power to
60
compel arbitration-was unavailable.
In contrast to agreements, commercial arbitration awards enjoyed
relatively greater judicial approbation during this era, but practice varied
across states. As Bruce Benson has explained, cases about the enforceability
of awards first emerged when non-legal sanctions-by, for example,
commercial or merchant industries-provided "insufficient inducements" to
persuade award debtors to satisfy the award. 6 Early nineteenth century
American courts scrutinized arbitration awards closely, declaring that they
62
could be set aside for errors of law, fact or minor procedural defects.
3. The Ascendancy of Testamentary Arbitration in the Late Nineteenth
Century
While Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Pray dealt a blow to the use
of arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments, his underlying reasoning
58
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321-22 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). See
also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 670, at 676 (13th ed. 1886) ("The regular administration of
justice might be impeded or interfered with by such stipulations if they were specifically
enforced. And at all events courts of justice are presumed to be better capable of
administering and enforcing the rights of the parties than any mere private arbitrators, as
well from their superior knowledge as from their superior means of sifting the
controversy to the very bottom.").
Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. 108 (1836).
60
MACNEIL, supra note 13.
61 Benson, supra note 13.
62
See generally Gross v. Zorger, 3 Yeates 521 (Pa. 1803); Williams v. Paschall, 4
U.S. 284 (Pa. 1803); Mansfield v. Doughty, 3 Mass. 398 (1807); Monseit v. Post, 4 Mass.
832 (1808).
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actually planted the seeds for a future resurgence of the device. Marshall's
emphasis on the testator's intent suggested that, in most cases where
arbitrators genuinely sought to give effect to that intent, their awards could
be enforced. Indeed, by the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, several state courts appeared to give effect to such provisions
precisely because doing so gave effect to the testator's intent.63
Courts enforcing these testamentary arbitration clauses adopted different
theories. Some derived a theory of enforceability from property rules: the
property holder had the absolute right to control the disposition of her
property, and this necessarily entailed a corollary power to control the
manner for resolving disputes over the transfer of that property. 64 Other
courts derived a theory of enforceability from contract rules: they analogized
the testamentary transfer of property to an agreement under which the
beneficiary took the property subject to certain conditions, which might
include assent to a dispute resolution mechanism."5
Not all states, however, took so sanguine a view of arbitration clauses in
testamentary documents. Some courts declined to enforce such clauses on the
ground that they unlawfully attempted to deprive the court of jurisdiction over a
dispute.66 Others relied instead on the view that property disputes involved the
determination of rights "binding on the whole world," and thus could not be
resolved bystipulated acceptance of a private arbitrator's decision.
The shifting and varied judicial views on testamentary arbitration
tracked similar trends in commercial arbitration. By the late nineteenth
century, judicial hostility toward specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements eroded, albeit in a nonsystematic manner and with variations
across the states.68 As Bruce Benson has documented, courts in Pennsylvania
and Virginia began to break down the rule against specific enforcement of
executory arbitration agreements as early as the 1850's, but these states were
63 Grant v. Stephens, 200 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Couts v. Holland, 107
S.W. 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Am. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15
F. 696 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883).
See, e.g., In re Phillips's Estate, 10 Pa. C.C. 374 (1891).
65
See, e.g., Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362 (1886).
66
See, e.g., Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213 (N.J. Ch. 1940).
67
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Bailey, 60 P. 162 (Cal. 1900).
68
MACNEIL, supra note 13 at 21. (In the especially colorful words of Ian Macneil,
"Before World War I, American arbitration law was, apart from state statutes, the
common law of Nowhere." (footnote omitted.)).
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outliers." Other states, like New York and Illinois, continued to apply the
rule against specific enforcement into the early twentieth century. 70 Federal
courts likewise remained hostile: as late as 1898, the Third Circuit invoked
the concept of jurisdictional ouster to refuse to enforce an executory
arbitration agreement.
The erosion in judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements charted a
similar shift in judicial attitudes toward the enforcement of arbitration awards.
The shift had already begun to occur in the middle of the nineteenth century,
albeit in a non-systematic fashion and with variation among the states. Virginia
courts again took the lead, followed soon thereafter by the Supreme Court of the
72United States. By 1854, the Court could already declare that "[i]f an award is
within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set aside for error,
either in law or in fact." 73 By the end the nineteenth century, commercial
74
arbitration awards enjoyed a greater currency.
In sum, United States courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries took a nuanced and complex view on testamentary arbitration.
While early decisions displayed a skepticism akin to that expressed in the
early English jurisprudence, those same decisions laid the intellectual
foundations for future decisions that were decidedly more supportive of
arbitration. Judicial solicitude toward arbitration was hardly uniform, and
courts considering these clauses-and the resulting awards---employed a
variety of theories. Those theories provided the architecture for doctrines in
testamentary arbitration that bear striking parallels to those found in modem
commercial arbitration doctrine. The next section examines those parallels.
69
Drogan, 35 U.S. 108; Snodgrass v. Gavit, 28 Pa. 221 (1857); Condon v. Southside
R.R. Co., 14 Va. 302 (Gratt. 1858) (Note Steve Ware's article on Voluntary Arbitration,
supra note 15, takes issue with these characterizations).
70 See Drogan, 35 U.S. 108; Snodgrass, 28 Pa. 221; Condon, 14 Va. 302.
71 Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639 (3d Cir. 1898).
72 See Doolittle v. Malcolm, 35 Va. 608 (Va. 1837); Hobson v. McArthur, 41 U.S.
182 (1842).
7 3 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
74
MACNErL, supra note 13, at 19.
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II. ALIGNING HISTORICAL CONCEPTS FROM TESTAMENTARY ARBITRATION
WITH MODERN CONCEPTS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The preceding section identified the parallels in the historical evolution
of testamentary and commercial arbitration. This section demonstrates how
those early testamentary cases contain the seeds of several doctrines akin to
those found in modem commercial arbitration jurisprudence. Specifically,
this section explores five topics: (A) the doctrine of kompetenz/kompentenz,
(B) the doctrine of separability, (C) general principles governing judicial
review of arbitral awards, (D) vacatur on grounds of a biased arbitrator and
(E) nonstatutory grounds of review, such as manifest disregard of the law.
A. Kompetenz/Kompetenz
Stripped to its essence, the doctrine of kompetenz/kompetenz provides
75
that an arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine her own jurisdiction. Though
seemingly tautological, the doctrine is essential to the proper functioning of
any arbitral system. The arbitrator draws her authority from the contractual
agreement of the parties. Despite the source of this authority, cases regularly
arise that challenge the enforceability of the arbitration clause such as, for
example, some generally applicable contract defense or some pathological
76
element in the clause. In these cases, the arbitrator will sometimes conclude
that the defense is valid and, thus, the arbitration clause is unenforceable.
This conclusion presents a logical conundrum: if the arbitrator derives her
power from the arbitration clause, but then concludes that the arbitration
clause is unenforceable, how can her award (so concluding) have any force?
The doctrine of kompetenz/kompentenz solves this conundrum by providing
that the arbitrator has the power to rule on challenges to her own jurisdiction.
In the United States, the FAA does not contain a specific provision
addressing this issue. Instead, the rule emerged through an amalgam of case
law and contractual practice. The seminal decision is typically seen to be the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in First Options." There, the Court held that
courts, rather than arbitrators, presumptively have the power to rule on
challenges to the arbitration clauses. However, if the agreement contains
75
See, e.g., William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan:
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT'L 137
(1996).
76
See generally BORN, supra note 45, at 563-766.
77
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); See also Rent-
A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
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clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended for the arbitrators
to rule on such matters, then courts must defer to that contractual allocation
of authority. As a matter of practice, most sets of arbitral rules attempt to
allocate decisions of this sort to arbitrators, and United States courts, relying
78
on First Options, generally have found these allocations sufficient.
Despite its relatively recent pedigree in modem commercial arbitration
law, the doctrine of kompetenz/kompetenz in the United States finds vestiges
in the older, pre-FAA decisions on testamentary arbitration. The California
Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. Bailey supplies good evidence.79
While the factual background is a bit murky, it appears that a dispute arose
among competing claimants to the estate of C.W. Carpenter (a class of
beneficiaries named in the will and a class of heirs contesting the will's
validity.) Some or all of the competing class members signed an arbitration
agreement, designating an individual with the power to decide "what, under
all the circumstances of the case, is a reasonable, just and equitable amount
of said estate to be set over to said contestants in full for all claims of each
and every of them." The idea, at the bottom, was that if the arbitrator found
in favor of the heirs, the beneficiaries would pay them in order to induce
them to abandon their contest of the will. The designated arbitrator rendered
an award, apparently in favor of the heirs (its contents are not apparent from
the opinion), who sought to show that the beneficiaries had never performed
their payment obligation under the award and, thus, were estopped from
insisting upon probate of the will. The heirs in Carpenter argued that the
probate of the will was also a matter for the arbitrators, not the court. The
California Supreme Court disagreed, declaring that:
[T]he matter of the contest cannot be submitted to
arbitration. The matter of the probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem, binding on the whole world. A few
individuals, claiming to be the heirs, cannot by stipulation
determine such controversy.
... To determine what would be just, reasonable and
equitable, the referee must pass upon the validity of the will.
If valid, it would be unjust and grossly inequitable to give
the contestants anything. If the will was found to be invalid,
78
See, e.g., Crawford Professional Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F. 3d
249 (5th Cir. 2014); See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INT'L
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 40-7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
79 Carpenter v. Bailey, 60 P. 162 (Cal. 1900).
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the contestants, if they were the heirs and the only heirs of
Carpenter, should have had all of it, and in such case it was
absurd to provide that the proponents should pay them for
80
their claim out of their own property.
The California Supreme Court's opinion reveals an awareness of
rudimentary concepts of kompetenz/kompetenz, albeit one not entirely in
harmony with First Options. Whereas the Supreme Court in First Options
created merely a default rule allocating to the court the power to resolve
challenges to the arbitration clause (one that could be overcome by clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to reallocate authority over that
decision to the arbitrator), Carpenter suggests there is an indissoluble core of
challenges-namely issues pertaining to the probate of a will-that cannot be
reallocated to the arbitrator regardless of the testator's intent.
A related feature of First Options was its rule on arbitrability. Whereas
the Supreme Court in First Options declined to presume that the parties
intended to arbitrate the validity of the arbitration agreement, absent clear
and unmistakable evidence of their intent to do so, the Court was quite
willing to entertain a more pro-arbitration presumption regarding the scope
of an otherwise valid clause. The Court presumed that the parties intended
for the arbitrator to decide whether a particular merits dispute is arbitrable.8 1
Pre-FAA testamentary arbitration decisions reflect a similar
presumption favoring a broad scope to the arbitration clause. The Texas
decision in Couts v. Holland supplies a good example. Couts involved the
construction of a will providing that a group of executors acting as "trustees"
should resolve questions of its interpretation.82 Couts' widow challenged the
trustees' authority to resolve such questions, and the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals rejected her challenge. It explained that:
We think the intent of the testator is clear that, wherever
there was doubt as to the meaning of the instrument, that
doubt was to be settled by the executors and by no one else.
The power to determine what the will means, in its every
part and provision involves, as well, the power to decide
80 Id. at 163.
81 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 at 626 (1985) ("[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.").
82 Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913 (Tex. Civ. App.1908).
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what property it operates upon as it does the power to decide
just what disposition is intended to be made of property
clearly within its operation. A doubtful question of
construction may as easily arise in the one case as in the
other.83
This passage from Couts bears close similarities to the ideas underpinning
First Options. Just as the Court in First Options presumed the parties' mutual
intention to confer on the arbitrator a broad authority to decide what claims
were arbitrable, so too does the Texas court in Couts confer onto the
arbitrator the power to determine the meaning of the will "whenever" there
was doubt as to the meaning of such instrument. Of course, nothing in the
will in Couts affirmatively expressed the testator's intent in this regard (just
as the contract in First Options did not contain such an expression of mutual
intent.) Instead, the courts in both cases infer that intent from the overall
design of the arbitration provisions.
Though the court in Couts was not explicit about the underlying policies
that favored this presumption, First Options was, and its reasoning applies
equally in the testamentary context: questions as to scope "arise when the
parties have a contract that provides for arbitration of some issues. And given
the law's permissive policies in respect to arbitration, one can understand
why the law would insist upon clarity before concluding that the parties did
not want to arbitrate a related matter."84 That same holds true in the context
of testamentary arbitration: by providing for arbitration of some disputes
arising out of the will, it is reasonable to presume that the testator, in the
interest of efficiency, would want all disputes resolved by the same
mechanism, unless he expressly provided otherwise.
B. Separability
Closely related to the doctrine of kompetenz/kompetenz is the doctrine
of separability. Put simply, the doctrine of separability provides that an
arbitration clause, contained within a larger contract, should, legally, be
treated as constituting a separate contract.
While some countries embed this doctrine in positive statutory law, the
FAA does not contain an unambiguous statement of the separability
principle. Instead, the principle, at least as a matter of federal law, emerged
8 3 Id. at 915.
First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
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from case law. Central to its development was the Supreme Court's decision
in Prima Paint. There, the Court distinguished between the substantive
contract and the arbitration provision contained in it and treated the two as
distinct agreements. This conception of the arbitration clauses as a "contract
within the contract" permitted a presumptive allocation of authority. The
arbitrator would henceforth decide challenges to the substantive agreement,
whereas challenges to the arbitration clause would presumptively be subject
86
to determination by the court. Decisions since Prima Paint have repeatedly
reaffirmed this principle.
As noted in Part I, Gary Spitko identified the lack of a separate
"agreement" as one of the intellectual challenges confronting testamentary
88
arbitration. Although beneficiaries to a will generally do not enter into a
89formal separate agreement, testamentary arbitration developed other means
of constructing rudimentary forms of the separability doctrine.
The contract theory, as discussed above, supplied the intellectual
architecture. Moore v. Harper serves as a good example. Moore involved an
arbitration provision contained in a will. A dispute arose among the
beneficiaries as to the question of whether the will's arbitration provision
could bind them. Concluding that it could, the court explained that
beneficiaries in a will took the benefit on the conditions set forth by the
85 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
86
The presumptive allocation of power was subsequently subject to several
modifications. For one thing, as noted above, First Options allowed parties to reallocate
to the arbitrator the authority to resolve challenges to the arbitration agreement. First
Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45. For another thing, courts still decide challenges to the
formation (as opposed to the validity) of the underlying contract. See Granite Rock Co. v.
Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010). Some authority suggests that if the
underlying contract was procured by fraud, as opposed to fraudulently induced, this
matter would be for the court. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 239-40 (Kluwer
1994). Finally, in some instances, the factual basis for an attack on the underlying
contract (like duress) might involve the exact same factual basis as an attack on the
arbitration agreement.
87 See Nitro-Life Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per
curiam); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
88 See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
89
There are, however, exceptional cases where beneficiaries enter into agreements,
following the testator's death, under which they agree to resolve disputes among
themselves by arbitration. See, e.g., In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009).
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testator, just as if they had "contracted for" that benefit. 90 The conditions, just
like a contract, were generally enforceable subject only to an examination of
their compatibility with the "public policy" of the forum.9 ' Justice Snyder
makes the analogy explicit in the following passage:
No authorities have been referred to, nor have I deemed it
necessary to look for precedents, as the question seems to me
to be so entirely analogous to contracts and other writings, in
which provision is made for their interpretation. . . . I can see
no reason why the same rule should not apply to a will. Of
course a will is not an agreement between two or more
contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding upon
the parties who take a benefit under it than if they had
contracted with the testator for that benefit.92
The Moore Court analogized the "bindingness" of a contract and the
"bindingness" of a will that obligates beneficiaries to take property subject to
certain conditions. While courts like Moore did not expressly use terms like
"separability," their reasoning suggested that the beneficiaries could be
"bound" to the arbitration clause by their conduct (that is, laying a claim to
the property described in the will) irrespective of whether that claim in fact
proved valid. This is similar to binding a party to arbitrate a dispute under a
modem-day commercial contract (perhaps through acceptance by conduct)
irrespective of whether the obligations set forth in the contract prove to be
valid and binding.
C. Award Enforcement - Generally
The FAA sets forth a mechanism whereby awards can be confirmed
subject to a limited set of exceptions. Those exceptions include:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
90 Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 374 (1886) ("Of course, a will is not an
agreement between two or more contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding
upon the parties who take a benefit than if they had contracted with the testator for that
benefit."); Ferry, 15 F. 696.
See Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9, 11 (1873).
92
Harper, 27 W. Va. at 373-74.
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(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
93
subject matter submitted was not made.
Prior to the FAA's enactment, various state statutes authorized their courts to
enforce awards subject to certain exceptions. 9 4 Where statutory standards
were lacking (as was the case in the federal system and some state systems),
courts developed common-law grounds for reviewing arbitral awards.
Testamentary arbitration jurisprudence embraced a similar approach. As
noted above, Pray implied the existence of such judicially created standards:
while the Court held that the award in that case was unenforceable due to an
erroneous construction of the will, Pray's reasoning suggested that, absent
such errors, the award could have been enforced. Later courts expounded on
that idea and articulated standards closely resembling those eventually
codified in the FAA. The 1883 federal district court's decision in Ferry
supplies a good example:
If the arbitrator refuses to act, awards upon a matter not
submitted, makes an incomplete determination, or commits a
gross mistake or error of judgment, evincing partiality,
corruption or prejudice, transcends his authority or violates
some statutory requirement on which the dissatisfied party
had a right to rely, or commits some other like error, courts
of equity may interfere and correct the error, and, in proper
cases, and upon good cause shown, restrain all further abuse
of the granted powers.95
93
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2015).
94
Indeed, one of those statutes-from New York-supplied the model for the FAA.
See MACNEIL, supra note 13, at 34-47.
95 See Ferry, 15 F. 700.
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96Other courts expressed similar views.
While the judicially articulated standards governing review of
testamentary arbitration awards resemble those later codified in the FAA,
they are not identical in every respect. To a degree, the two standards are
common. For example, both the FAA and the Ferry standards envision
review in cases of partiality or corruption of the arbitrator. Similarly, the
FAA standards permit vacatur in cases where the arbitrator "exceeds his
power," and the Ferry standards likewise permit vacatur in cases where the
arbitrator "transcends his authority."
In other respects, though, the two standards differ. Sometimes, the FAA
standards sweep more broadly: they envision vacatur in cases of certain
procedural rulings (like failure to postpone the hearing or failure to hear
evidence); whereas the Ferry standards do not. Elsewhere, the Ferry
standards sweep more broadly: they envision review in cases where the
arbitrator "commits a gross mistake or error of judgment;" whereas the FAA
does not contain such a ground (at least explicitly - more on this point later).
One distinctive feature of the Ferry standard should be noted. The Ferry
standard envisions that courts have the power to enjoin arbitration where the
arbitrator has acted in some impermissible manner ("in proper cases, and
upon good cause shown, restrain all further abuse of the granted powers.").
The FAA does not expressly authorize such use of injunctive relief, a topic
that has bedeviled some courts and commentators in modem commercial
97
practice.
96
See Harper, 27 W. Va. at 374.
See Elizabeth Phillips, Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Do the Courts Really
Have Jurisdiction, 1991 J. DisP. RESOL. 381, 381 (1991) (noting the division among
courts and commentators concerning whether courts may order injunctive relief pending
arbitration); Caz Hashemi, Preliminary Injunctions Pending Arbitration Under the
Federal Arbitration Act: Judicial Misinterpretation, Judicial Intervention, and
Confusion, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 985, 985 (1997) (noting the many divided court cases on
the issue of court-ordered preliminary injunctions pending arbitration, as well as the
extensive scholarship arguing support for court-ordered injunctive relief in pending
arbitration cases); Anahit Tagvoryan, Secret in One District Is No Secret in Another: The
Case of Merrill Lynch and Preliminary Injunctions under the FAA, 6 PEPP. DisP. RESOL.
L.J. 147, 164-65 (2006). For a helpful breakdown of court decisions by circuit, see NOAH
SisuIIm GITTERMAN, PETER SHERWIN, DANIELLA M. RUDY, & JEAN CLEMENTE,
PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: MANAGING, RESOLVING,
AND AVOIDING CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS REGULATORY DISPUTES ch. 22, pt. IV (2007),
available at http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/22/IV.
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D. Neutrality Of Decision Maker
Apart from the general parallels in standards governing award
enforceability, commercial and testamentary arbitration reveal similar
synergies with respect to their rules governing arbitrator bias. Section
10(a)(2) of the FAA provides that an award may be vacated "where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them." The
precise meaning of this provision has frustrated courts ever since the FAA's
enactment.
Central to the debate is the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth
Coatings.99 There, the Supreme Court held that a commercial arbitration
award should be vacated where the chair of a three-member tribunal had an
undisclosed relationship with one of the parties. Specifically, the chair of the
tribunal had provided consulting services to one of the parties. Although he
had not provided such services for the year preceding the arbitration, some of
those services concerned the very project that was the subject of the dispute.
The chair did not disclose this relationship to the parties, although no
evidence positively suggested that the relationship had affected the outcome
(which was unanimous).
While a clear majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the award
needed to be vacated under these circumstances, the justices disagreed over
the nature of the error warranting this result. Some took the view, articulated
by Justice Black, that the very nature of the relationship (disclosed or not)
cast sufficient doubt on the neutrality of the arbitrator, whom he likened to a
judge in terms of his ethical obligations.'oo Others took the view, articulated
by Justice White, that the critical error was the arbitrator's failure to disclose
the relationship. 'o1 (The dissenting justices believed that vacatur was
inappropriate because there was no indication that the chair's past
relationship influenced the proceedings or otherwise worked an actual
prejudice on the parties).102 Since Commonwealth Coatings, lower courts
have grappled with the precise reach of the Court's holding, and the
dominant view in both the case law and the commentary seems to have
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2015).
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'1 Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 147-50.
101 Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152-55.
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vindicated Justice White's focus on the need for disclosure rather than Justice
Black's stricter rules on certain categorically disqualifying relationships.1
Long before Commonwealth Coatings (or, for that matter, the FAA),
courts in testamentary arbitrations grappled with similar issues and reached
results largely parallel to those articulated by Justice White. A central theme
throughout these cases was what a court should do about a decision by-an
arbitrator who was also a legatee. Since the legatee/arbitrator might well
benefit personally from the results of his award, did this create an
insurmountable conflict of interest obligating the court to refuse
enforcement?
Much like Justice White, early courts considering testamentary
arbitration concluded that the answer turned on whether the testator was
aware of the conflict when he designated the legatee also to serve as an
arbitrator. An early example of this reasoning appeared in the Connecticut
Supreme Court's decision in Wait.104 Wait involved the construction of a will
providing that, if questions arose as to its meaning, the distribution of the
estate "shall be made to such person and associations as my executors shall
determine to be my intended legatees and devisees." The will provided
further that the executors' determination shall be "binding upon all persons
interested." Interestingly, the executors sought the advice of the Connecticut
courts on whether their award could be binding. In finding that it could, the
state's highest court explained that:
The testator ... was fully aware of the relation in which these
gentlemen stand to his estate, and he was willing to entrust
them with the power under consideration, their interest
notwithstanding. We do not feel authorized to make a
disqualification which the testator did not see fit to make.
Where however an executor is directly interested he may
properly excuse himself from acting upon the matter thus
affecting his interests.'05
Wait was not an isolated instance unique to Connecticut. Other courts,
including federal ones, reached similar conclusions. Exemplary in this regard
103 See generally Andrew M. Campbell, Construction and Application of 10(a)(1)-
(3) ofFederal Arbitration Act, 141 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1997 & supp.) (collecting cases).
Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9 (1873).
Id. at 12.
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was the Ferry decision from Michigan. There, the court drew expressly on
Pray to find a similar conflict not fatal to the award:
It is enough to say that it has never been understood as an
inhibition upon the rights of individuals to select their own
tribunals provided they do so with a full knowledge of all the
facts, for the adjustment and determination of such
controversies as they may choose to submit to arbitrament.
... But the [Pray] court did not adjudge that an interested
party could not, under any circumstances, act as an umpire.
The decision is that he cannot do so in an unforeseen
contingency not within the scope of the testator's
intentions.106
By 1916, only a few years before the FAA's enactment, a treatise on the law
of wills could confidently declare: "The fact that such umpire is interested in
the residue of the estate which may be increased or diminished by his
decisions does not disqualify him to act."10' 7
These authorities suggest that Justice White may have had the better of
the argument in Commonwealth Coatings. The emphasis on the testator's
known intent at the time he or she designated an arbitrator with a vested
interest in the estate suggests that the relationship between bias and the
enforceability of the award should train on considerations of disclosure
(identified by Justice White), rather than the categorical approach (articulated
by Justice Black). To be sure, there must be undisputed evidence that the
testator was fully aware of the arbitrator's interests at the time of his or her
designation. But once aware, that interest (unless circumstances changed)
would not supply a basis for refusing to enforce the award. By analogy,
under commercial practice, if an arbitrator disclosed a potential conflict of
interest - and none of the parties objected to the conflict - then that
relationship likewise could not supply a basis for vacatur. But if the conflict
were undisclosed, then a sufficiently serious one, such as that at issue in
Commonwealth Coatings, could supply a basis for vacatur.
106
See Ferry, 15 F. at 701 (emphasis added). See also Talladega Coll., 197 N.W.
635, 637-38 (1924) ("There is also respectable authority to the effect that the residuary
legatee is not thereby disqualified from exercising this function. [Ferry]. The reason for
this holding is that the testator had a right to do as he would with his own, and that he had
equally the right to naie the same person as residuary legatee, as executor and as
arbiter.").
1o7 G.W. THompsoN, THE LAW OF WILLS 379 (6th ed. 1916).
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E. Award Enforcement - Non-statutory Grounds
One of the hotly debated questions in modem commercial arbitration
practice is the extent to which the FAA permits a court to review the
substance of the award. os Facially, the FAA would appear to set forth the
exclusive grounds for vacatur of an award. Section 9 of the FAA authorizes
the prevailing party to apply for confirmation of the award after it is rendered
and provides that "the court must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in Sections 10 and 11 of this
title."' 09 United States courts, though, have never strictly adhered to Section
9's commands. Instead, they have developed a variety of non-statutory
grounds upon which awards can be vacated. These include, among others,
where the arbitrator's award (a) manifestly disregarded the law or (b) failed
to draw its essence from the agreement.
These doctrines have presented a host of nettlesome problems for courts
and scholars of commercial arbitration. Are they compatible with the FAA,
which suggests that its grounds for vacating an award are exclusive? Even if
they are compatible, what are the precise standards for each of these
doctrines? Are they distinct grounds? Here too, early testamentary arbitration
jurisprudence is revealing and instructive.
Manifest Disregard: Most common among these is the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine. Under the most conventional form of the
doctrine, an award may be set aside if the arbitrator was aware of the
applicable law and consciously refused to apply it. Though the continuing
vitality of that doctrine has fallen into some doubt, it continues to be applied
in some jurisdictions.no
108 See BORN, supra note 45 at 2638 n. 452 (collecting commentary).
1099 U.S.C. § 9 (2015).
110 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n. 3 (2010) (stating that the Court
does not decide whether the doctrine of manifest disregard survives its decision in Hall
Street as a separate basis for review in addition to FAA § 10 grounds); See also, circuit
split on whether the doctrine of manifest disregard survives Hall Street: Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 584 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), cert granted, Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (agreeing that "'manifest disregard,'
reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in
section 10 of the FAA, remains a valid ground for vacating awards"); Frazier v.
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) ("We hold that our judicially-
created bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light of Hall Street.").
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Modem commercial arbitration jurisprudence traces this doctrine to the
Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan. That decision, marking
the high-point in the Supreme Court's non-arbitrability jurisprudence, held
that claims under the 1933 Securities Act were not arbitrable. Among the
reasons cited by the Court was the fact that "interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."ll2 In expressing this
view, Wilko captured a common-law doctrine that predated the FAA's
enactment, albeit with subtly different requirements.113
Testamentary arbitration decisions prior to the FAA's enactment
likewise reveal a rudimentary form of the manifest disregard doctrine. Ferry,
described above, supplies a good example. There, the federal district court
explained:
The rule, as we conceive it is, when an arbitrator honestly
and in good faith exercises his power and passes upon a
doubtful question, either of law or of fact, his decision will
not be revised by a court, notwithstanding the court, whose
interposition is invoked, may think his decision erroneous.
As a rule, the courts will not interpose to correct a mere
mistake in the judgment of an arbitrator. But if the arbitrator
. . . commits a gross mistake or error of judgment, evincing
partiality, corruption or prejudice . . . courts of equity may
interfere and correct the error and, in proper cases, and upon
good cause shown, restrain all further abuses of the granted
114
powers.
A few decades later, in language similar to that employed by the court in
Ferry, Thompson's treatise on the law of wills surveyed the extant case law
and declared that:
Where, however, such umpire renders a decision involving a
clear abuse of his power, or where he commits a gross
mistake or error of judgment evincing partiality, corruption
Ill
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Id. at 436-37.
113 Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE
L.J. 547, 557 (2005).
114 See Ferry, 15SF. at 700.
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or prejudice, the court will interfere and decide whether the
construction adopted by the umpire is correct.1s
The formulations from Ferry and the Thompson treatise present an
interesting contrast to the conventional understanding of the manifest
disregard doctrine. Though the phrase "gross mistake" might seem to imply
some analogy to the doctrine, the rest of the sentence suggests two critical
differences. First, depending on how one reads the clause, the mistake might,
like the "error of judgment," be one that "evinc[es] partiality, corruption or
prejudice." Read this way, the suggestion would be that bare legal error does
not suffice but, instead, must be tied into some fact casting doubt on the
arbitrator's objectivity. (Of course, if this reading is correct, one is left to
wonder what work manifest disregard really does since arbitrator bias
already supplied a ground for vacating award). In this regard, the Thompson
treatise lends some support to the idea, expressed most clearly by the Court
in the modem-day Hall Street case, that manifest disregard is best understood
not as an independent ground but, instead, an encapsulation of other grounds
for vacatur.6
Assuming, though, that manifest disregard does have some independent
significance, the second telling feature of Thompson's formulation concerns
its impact. According to Thompson, the effect of an arbitrator's manifest
disregard of the law is not automatic vacatur of the award (as it would be in
115
THOMPSON, supra note 107, at 379-80.
1 Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. at 585 (2008) ("Maybe the term 'manifest disregard' was
meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 ground
collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some courts have thought, 'manifest
disregard' may have been shorthand for §10(a)(3) or §10(a)(4), the paragraphs
authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were 'guilty of misconduct' or 'exceeded their
powers."'); See Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., L.L.C., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.
2010) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350-55 (5th Cir. 2009), which relied upon "Hall Street's
'unequivocal' holding that the statutory grounds listed in § 10 are the exclusive means for
vacatur, and held that 'manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground
for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA'."). See Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 584 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), cert granted, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (equating manifest disregard to § 10(a)(4) by stating that
"arbitrators have thereby 'exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4))); Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277,
1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341
F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the manifest disregard ground for vacatur
survives the Hall Street decision because it is part of § 10(a)(4))).
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modem jurisprudence). Instead, the effect of the error is that the court
intervenes and decides whether the arbitrator's construction of the will is
correct. In other words, the arbitrator might still have reached the correct
result, notwithstanding his or her error, in which case the court would still
confirm the award. What a finding of manifest disregard does, then, is
liberate the court from the deference that it would otherwise show the
award.117 If correct, this could have profound implications for modem-day
understanding of the manifest disregard doctrine.
Essence of the agreement: The Supreme Court has held that awards can
be set aside where the arbitrator dispenses his own brand of justice and fails
to render an award that "draws its essence from the contract." 11
Conventional narrative traces this doctrine to the Steelworkers Trilogy. These
three cases all concerned labor arbitration, and one (Enterprise Wheel)
specifically addressed the relationship between arbitrators and courts. While
reaffirming that courts should not review the merits of an arbitrator's
decision, the Supreme Court observed that:
An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award." 9
117 In this regard, it functions like a finding in a 2254 habeas proceeding-a federal
court's determination on habeas that a state court unreasonably applied settled Supreme
Court precedent or unreasonably found the facts to entitle the federal court to undertake a
de novo review of the incarcerated prisoner's underlying constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2012); KRISTINE M. Fox, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CAPITAL § 2254 HABEAS CASES:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14-15 (2012); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-
54 (2007).
"' United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) ("Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.").
Id.
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Though developed in the context of labor arbitration, the doctrine has
been transposed in some cases into commercial arbitration, including in cases
where a few courts have held that an award should be vacated because the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the contract.120
In testamentary arbitration, vestiges of the doctrine can be seen as early
as Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Pray. Chief Justice Marshall hints at
this concept in several places of his opinion, including the quote given at the
beginning of this Article.121 Elsewhere, he notes:
If an unreasonable use be made of the power, one not foreseen,
and which could not be intended by the testator, it has been considered
as a case in which the general power of Courts of Justice to decide on
the right of parties ought to be exercised.122
Pray was, moreover, more than an isolated occurrence. Later courts, up
to the time of the FAA's enactment repeatedly invoked Pray's mantra and, in
some cases, relied upon it to refuse confirmation of an award. Both federal
and state courts repeatedly stressed this point in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, invoking Pray in some cases.123 Exemplary in this regard
120 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (extending
Misco doctrine to commercial case); Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230,
237 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding the arbitration award was in manifest disregard of the
contract); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 58
(2000) (confirming the Misco doctrine and concluding that a public policy exception to
enforcing an award did not exist in this employment case); United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (labor arbitration); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (labor
arbitration); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (labor
arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974) (holding that an
arbitrator's authority relates only to questions of contractual rights, and parties may still
have independent statutory rights not prevented by the arbitration award); Steelworkers
Trilogy (Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960))(holding that courts should uphold an arbitrator's
award unless the "essence" of the award was not derived from the contract).
121
See Pray, 26 U.S. 670.
122
Id. at 680.
123
Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. at 11. ("In the improbable contingency of a clear
abuse of the power, such abuse would undoubtedly be restrained and corrected, for the
power of the executors is not so absolute and unlimited as to be beyond the control of the
court. So too, in order to give jurisdiction to the executors, there must be a bona fide
question. Under the name and pretense of construction they may not arbitrarily transfer
the testator's gifts from the real and proper objects of his bounty. Subject to these and the
like qualifications, we think the testator may safely be indulged in the enlarged control
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is the Texas Appellate Court's decision in Grant. There, the Court, building
upon Pray, articulated a standard quite similar to the "essence of the
agreement" standard later set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy:
Since we do not feel justified in holding that the conclusion
reached by the executors and trustees upon this point was not
fairly and honestly made, and reasonably to be predicated
upon the terms of the will taken as a whole, it follows that
we are not authorized, under the authorities, to overrule their
decision. Of course, if the decision made by the trustees
evidenced a gross departure from the manifest intent of the
testator as disclosed in the will, then it could not be said that
such decision was the result of an honest endeavor to find
that intent, as held in [Pray]. But we do not find such a
conclusion to exist here, and are of the opinion that said
conclusion reached by the trustees, upon a question
involving the proper construction of the terms used by the
testator, is one reasonably reached and deduced from the
language used.124
Other courts applied a comparable standard. 12 5
These synergies between the non-statutory grounds for judicial review
of modem-day awards and the pre-FAA testamentary decisions raise
interesting questions about the proper construction of the FAA. The Court
over his property which he exercises through the clause in question."); See Ferry, 15 F. at
699-700 ("Such provisions do not vest such umpires with authority to ignore the
testator's intentions as expressed in the will, and substitute his own wishes. 'Clauses of
this description [says CJ Marshall in Pray] have always received such judicial
construction as would comport with the reasonable intention of the testator.' ... Such
gross departure from the manifest intent of the testator would be considered by the courts
as evidence of a fraudulent exercise of the power conferred.").
124 Grant v. Stephens, 200 S.W. 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
125
Talladega Coll. v. Callanan, 197 N.W. 635, 637 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1924) (The one
qualification which is put by many of the authorities upon the exercise of such power by
the executors is that it must be in good faith. This necessarily means that the question
raised must present a fair dispute. The decision may not be arbitrary. It may not
contradict the clear provision of the will. In other words, the power may not be abused.);
Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913, 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 1908) ("Can we say that this
decision of the tribunal to which the testator himself saw fit to commit the authoritative
interpretation of his will was obviously and wholly without foundation? We have
concluded that we cannot.").
307
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
has routinely suggested that Congress enacts statutes against the background
of common-law understandings and therefore, will not be lightly understood
as derogating from the common-law.126 The pre-FAA testamentary decisions
suggest that each of these doctrines enjoyed some support before the FAA's
enactment and, thus, form part of the corpus of common-law understandings
against which Congress enacted statutes. While the Supreme Court has at
times suggested that the FAA's grounds are exclusive and even hinted that
some of these doctrines (like manifest disregard) might not supply an
independent standard, the testamentary arbitration decisions offer some
evidence to the contrary.
While provocative, the point should not be overstated. The pre-FAA
testamentary jurisprudence presents only a limited supply of decisions.
Moreover, as noted in Part I, the common-law sentiments expressed by
federal and state courts were far from uniform. Finally, any argument in this
regard would potentially have to take into account the fact that the FAA only
regulated arbitration agreements contained in contracts "involving
commerce." 127 Consequently, decisions involving purely local disputes
arguably only have limited value in assessing the common-law background
against which Congress adopted the statute.
126
See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)
(Court reasoned that "Congress is understood to legislate against a background of
common-law" in the adjudicatory context, specifically stating, "[t]hus, where a common-
law principle is well established, as are the rules of preclusion, the courts may take it as
given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [common-law
adjudicatory] principle[s] will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident."'). See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983) (citing City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981)) ("It is by now well settled that the tort
liability created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.. .One important
assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42d
Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously
recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary."). See Adam Bain & Ugo
Coella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 493, 513
(2004) ("...the guiding rule of construction is that, absent an express definition of a
particular statutory term, Congress intends to adopt the same meaning of terms that was
recognized at common law at the time of the statute's enactment."); Id. at 527 ("With
respect to Congressional intent in enacting legislation, Congress is presumed to know the
state of the common law at the time it enacts a statute. Therefore, Congress intends to
endorse the common law rule unless Congress demonstrates a contrary intent.").
127
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2015); See also Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
118 (2001).
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TESTAMENTARY AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The foregoing analysis of the common ground between testamentary
arbitration prior to the FAA's enactment and modern commercial arbitration
has several implications. First, it cuts against criticism that testamentary
arbitration, absent express statutory authorization, should not be enforced.
Second, it encourages the further cross-fertilization of arbitration precedent
from different fields, including resort to precedents from testamentary
arbitration to inform commercial arbitration questions (and visa versa).
Third, it calls for deeper research into unanswered questions about the
history of testamentary arbitration. This final section traces each of these
implications.
First, the historical connective tissue between testamentary arbitration
and commercial arbitration should serve to silence skeptics that believe the
former to be unenforceable absent express statutory authorization. The
above-described scholarship of Katzen and Murphy evinced skepticism
toward testamentary arbitration due to perceived incompatibilities between
that form of dispute resolution and modern commercial arbitration statutes,
particularly the lack of an agreement.128 Yet this study demonstrates that,
already in the nineteenth century, courts had developed sophisticated
analogies between testamentary arbitration and commercial arbitration to
overcome these sorts of objections based on the lack of consent or a written
agreement. While statutory fixes may offer the benefit of clarity, they are not
strictly necessary. By the nineteenth century, courts had engrafted
commercial arbitration doctrines onto testamentary arbitration, including
devices for managing the tricky issue of consent, without the need for
statutory fixes. Contemporary courts recognizing this compatibility have the
better argument.129
Second, the foregoing analysis encourages further cross-fertilization of
arbitration precedents from different fields. For several decades, United
States courts have struggled with uneasy questions about the extent to which
arbitration decisions involving one field (such as employment arbitration)
may inform interpretive questions involving arbitration in other fields (like
309
128 See Katzen, supra note 30; Murphy, supra note 26.
129
Kyser v. Kasson Township, 769 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
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international arbitration). 130These questions arise due to two related forces.
First, unlike many other countries, the United States has a single arbitration
act that, with little exception, does not differentiate among forms of
arbitration. (By contrast, many foreign countries have at least two arbitration
statutes - one governing international arbitration and one governing domestic
arbitration). Second, unlike some other countries, the United States takes a
fairly liberal view about the arbitrability of disputes. For example, it permits
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in employment and consumer
contracts, fields that are much more heavily regulated in some other
.131
countries.
The net effect of these two forces is to create situations in which courts
(and parties) cite decisions involving one field of arbitration in a case
involving another. The Supreme Court's very recent decision in BG Group v.
Argentina supplies an especially apt example. In terms of the field, that case
arose in the context of an investment arbitration between British investors
and the Republic of Argentina.132 As a matter of statutory interpretation,
though, it concerned whether, and to what extent, United States courts in
post-award proceedings should defer to the arbitrator's determination of
jurisdiction - a question as likely to arise in domestic employment arbitration
as in international investment arbitration. In resolving this matter, the
Supreme Court drew heavily on precedents, both ones involving foreign
arbitration and ones involving domestic arbitration, to decide the interpretive
question.
The analysis of testamentary arbitration in Part II encourages these sorts
of resorts to other fields of arbitration to inform unresolved questions of
commercial arbitration and, more generally, the sort of cross-fertilization of
precedents from different arbitration fields that Justice Whittaker sought to
undertake in the Steelworkers Trilogy. For example, the jurisprudence on
arbitrator neutrality in the area of testamentary arbitration may help to inform
nettlesome questions under Section 10 of the FAA regarding the sorts of
arbitrator conflicts that might result in set aside of the award. Similarly, the
sentiments expressed in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Pray regarding
an arbitrator's decision that deviated from the testator's intent, may help to
130 Example of early move in this regard was Justice Whittaker's dissent in
Steelworkers Trilogy that sought to invoke commercial cases to resolve questions before
the Court. See MACNEIL, supra note 13, at 57.
131 See BORN, supra note 45 at 766-840.
132
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014). For
background on investment arbitration, see Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10
ICSID Rev. 232 (1995).
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inform the meaning of vacatur grounds predicated on a finding that an
arbitrator "exceeded his powers" or that the award "failed to draw its essence
from the contract."
Third, the analysis in Part II charts a course for future research into
unresolved questions about testamentary arbitration. Some of those questions
are doctrinal-for example, is there an indivisible core of challenges to the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal that may not be reallocated from courts?
The New Jersey Chancery Court in Taylor highlighted the fact that a will,
unlike a contract, for example, confers property rights against the world. 13 3
Consequently, when issues arise about the validity of the right-conferring
document, can those questions ever be accorded to an arbitrator, even where
the testator has expressed a clear and unambiguous intent to do so? And if
the answer is "no," what implications does this hold for decisions, like First
Options, that contemplate the possibility that parties may reallocate questions
about the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator (in lieu of a
pre-dispute judicial determination).
Other questions are historical. For example, given the historical
reticence of English courts to enforce arbitration clauses in testamentary
documents, why precisely did individuals like George Washington and
Pray/Belt choose to insert them into their wills? Does it reveal something
about norms of litigiousness during the late eighteenth century, such as that
disappointed beneficiaries simply would not litigate and would willingly
accept an arbitrator's decision (regardless of its enforceability)? Similarly,
one of the most mystifying features of the primary materials in this area is
the complete dearth of reported decisions between Chief Justice Marshall's
1828 decision in Pray and the Connecticut high court's 1873 decision in
Wait. What explanation for this lacuna? Is it simply deference to Pray even
though state supreme courts would be free to ignore the decision in cases
falling outside federal court jurisdiction? Or did Wait intersect with the
grudging emergence of commercial arbitration in the post-Civil War era? If
the latter is true, it enhances the importance of continued study of
testamentary arbitration as part of the forces that led to the modem
acceptance of executory commercial agreements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Testamentary arbitration offers an important, but under-explored field,
one that can both inform commercial arbitration and be informed by it. Close
examination of the historical precedents, prior to the FAA's enactment,
133See Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213 (N.J. Ch. 1940)
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reveal early forms of doctrines that later developed in the jurisprudence
governing commercial cases falling under the FAA. Not only does this
historical examination offer important lessons for the extent to which courts
can engraft modern arbitration statutes onto testamentary disputes, it also
lends support to the growing trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence to borrow
precedents from one field of arbitration (like investment or consumer) to
inform the development of doctrines in other fields (like labor or
employment). Future research can both test the limits of this cross-fertilized
jurisprudence and shed light on the gaps in the historical record.
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